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The provision of third-party access to rail infrastructure in WA’s Pilbara region has been 
a contentious issue over the past decade.  The most recent endeavour proposed by the 
State Government involves a haulage regime, whereby incumbents would be required to 
haul the wagons of third parties seeking access to the line.  This paper explores the likely 
costs of such a regime on the host railways, by examining the impacts of voluntary 
haulage regimes on US Class One Railways, where they are well-established.  It finds 
that haulage regimes are a cost effective means for US railways to reduce their haulage 
costs, and that they thus might play a role in the Pilbara.  However, consideration of 
whole-of-system costs, congestion and appropriate pricing are key issues.  This paper 
explores these issues, and proposes a simple pricing mechanism which would ensure fair, 
efficient haulage with only very limited regulatory involvement. 
2 
Assessing the Costs of a Haulage Regime 
Introduction 
Iron Ore mined in WA’s Pilbara region is transported to Port Hedland (in the case of 
BHP) and Cape Lambert and Dampier (in the case of Rio Tinto) using the two largest 
private rail networks in Australia.  When the track infrastructure was created in the 
1960s, its governing State Agreement Acts envisaged third party access to the track, 
under appropriate circumstances but none has thus far emerged.  More recently, Hope 
Downs Ltd and the Fortescue Metals Group (FMG) have sought access to (respectively) 
Rio Tinto and BHP’s track under the aegis of the National Competition Council.  The 
first attempt failed, whilst the latter is ongoing.  In an endeavour to break the impasse, the 
Pilbara Rail Infrastructure Advisory Committee (PRIAC) was formed within State 
Government in 2006 to consider the merits of a haulage regime.  That is, rather than 
access being provided for the trains of third parties like FMG, the incumbent railway 
operators would be required to haul the wagons of third parties.  Such regimes, voluntary 
in nature, operate on US railways, and thus they provide a useful tool to explore the likely 
impacts of a haulage regime in the Pilbara. 
 
Section One of this paper provides some background to the US rail industry, and the use 
of voluntary haulage regimes.  Section Two introduces the modelling framework, and the 
data used in the model.  Section Three presents the modelling results and associated 
analysis.  Section Four concludes with some policy ramifications with respect to haulage 
regimes in the Pilbara region. 
US Class One Railways 
The US rail industry is much larger than its Australian counterpart.  In terms of revenue, 
the US rail industry is roughly six and a half times as large as the Australian rail industry; 
US$54 billion in 2006 (AAR, 2008a) as compared to A$11 billion in 2005 (ARA, 2006).  
In terms of the volume of freight, however, Australian railways carry barely three percent 
of the freight carried by their US peers.1  However, the Australian rail freight task has 
grown much faster over the past two decades; 250 percent as compared to 73 percent in 










                                                 
1 The Australian figure includes roughly $3 billion in various forms of subsidy from government.  It also 
includes revenues from commuter passenger railways, which the US data does not.  This accounts for the 















































































Source: US data: STB R1 Annual Reports, Australian data: ARA, 2007  
 
The US freight task is more diverse than it is in Australia.  This is reflective both of a 
more well-developed rail system serving a larger population and economy, and also of 
demographic spread.  The US has relatively densely populated east and west coasts (with 
many major cities in between) and Australia does not.  This gives scope for more and 
more varied trans-continental traffic in the US compared to Australia.  Moreover, the US 
is well-served by inland waterways, which compete with railways for haulage of bulk 
commodities.  These reasons combine to result in less reliance on bulk export minerals, 
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Source: AAR, 2008a 
 
Despite the relative diversity of the freight task in the US, coal remains the most 
important commodity for US railways.  However, growth of manufacturing in China has 
lead to a large increase in intermodal traffic (encompassing several categories in Figure 
Two), shipped from ports in California to the rest of the US.  In 2003, the various 
categories of intermodal freight surpassed coal for the first time and currently account for 
around 23 percent of revenues (AAR, 2008a).  Intermodal freight has quadrupled over the 
past 25 years and represents a major source of earnings growth for the industry.  In 
contrast to the situation in Australia, rail freight in the US has kept pace with trucking 
over the past 25 years; in fact rail has increased its share of the transport task.   
 
The US industry is also much more profitable than Australian railways.  Although profits 
are less than the median for US industry, they have been increasing in recent years, 
peaking at a return on equity of 14 percent in 2006 (AAR, 2008b).  By contrast, the best 
performing of the Australian railways for which data are available, QR, averaged a return 
on equity of roughly five percent from 2000 to 2004 (PC, 2004).  Despite this, investment 
in both Australian and US railways has averaged roughly 20 percent of revenues over the 
past five years (US data from AAR, 2008b, Australian data from Wills-Johnson, 2007).  
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The difference is that funds for investment in the US are private, including Berkshire 
Hathaway and other major investment funds (see Machalabar, 2008), whilst Australian 
railways must rely on government for much of their investment.  This is due not only to 
the much larger size of US railways, allowing them to reap economies of density and 
scope, but also to the fact that Australian rail data includes commuter and intercity 
passenger rail tasks, whilst none of the US Class One (see below) railways to which the 
information in this section pertains have any significant passenger task.  Passenger rail 
requires subsidies, whilst freight is generally profitable and does not.   
 
US railways are divided into three classes for the purposes of economic regulation;2 
Class One railways refer to those with revenues in excess of US$289 million per annum, 
Class Two refer to railways with revenues between US$20 million and US$289 million, 
and Class Three railways refer to small railways with revenues of less than US$20 
million per annum.  The differentiation is made to spare smaller railways of some of the 
regulatory burden which is necessary for the effective oversight of their larger peers.  
There are seven Class One railways, accounting for 93 percent of total rail freight carried 
and 90 percent of total rail employment.  Many of the smaller railways either serve 
localised demand, or act as feeders to the Class One railways.  In fact, many are creations 
of the industry rationalisation process which followed reform of the industry in 1980. 
 
In 1980, the US rail industry underwent major reform under the Staggers Act, which 
sought to arrest the decline, apparent for many decades but hastening in the 1970s.  By 
1980, the railways had been regulated federally for nearly 100 years, and the resulting 
web of regulatory practice had come close to strangling their businesses with more than 
21 percent of US rail track accounted for by companies in bankruptcy by the mid 1970s 
(AAR, 2008c).  The Staggers Act made a number of key changes: 
• It allowed railways more freedom to price discriminate and price commercially (and 
confidentially) for their services, abolishing most collective rates. 
• It provided much more streamlined mechanisms for line abandonment and sale, 
creating, in effect, the genesis of the short line railway movement in the US. 
• It reduced the range of services over which the regulator, then the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) but since 1996 the Surface Transportation Board 
(STB), could apply regulation and shifted the focus of rate investigations to a greater 
consideration of rate adequacy for the railway. 
 
The response of the railways to these reforms was dramatic.  Since 1980, the industry has 
consolidated, merging 40 railways into seven and reaping the resultant economies of 
scale.3  It has also increased labour productivity by some 167 percent, amongst the best 
performance of any US industry, and certainly better than the 15 percent increase in the 
25 years prior to 1980.  At the same time, real rates have decreased by 55 percent, 
resulting in railways increasing their market share of the freight task from roughly 35 
percent in the 1970s to more than 40 percent today (AAR, 2008c). 
                                                 
2 None of these classes include commuter rail, although the regulator does have a role in overseeing 
Amtrack, the US intercity passenger railway. 
3 In part this is due to changing definitions of a Class One railway.  If the same real revenue cut-off used 




Although the Staggers Act removed much of the regulation of US railways, it did not 
deregulate them entirely.  The STB retains powers to set rates, approve mergers and 
pooling arrangements, oversee line abandonment and construction (including an ability to 
require other railways to allow the new line to cross their own) and regulate the 
interchange of traffic amongst carriers.  It can also compel railways to meet its service 
obligations, provide an alternative service, or give access to a terminal or switching 
infrastructure.  Finally, the STB also monitors the financial condition of Class One 
Railways through its R1 Annual Reporting mechanism, discussed further under the 
discussion on data used in this paper below. 
 
This reporting and monitoring role, which began in the early 20th Century, has proven to 
be very useful in economic analysis.  The annual reports contain detailed data which are 
consistent across railways and across long periods of time.  Moreover, they are public 
documents.  As a result, US railways have been extensively analysed by economic 
researchers.  Bitzan (2000) provides an overview of this literature. 
Private Cars and Haulage Regimes 
Private cars refer to cars that are hauled by the railways, but which are neither owned nor 
leased by them.  Private cars are hauled under contractual haulage regimes, the voluntary 
equivalent of what is planned for the Pilbara.  Haulage regimes are a popular way in 
which railways can extend their reach to cities where they do not own any track.  They 
are often also much less burdensome in a contractual, administrative and regulatory sense 
than other ways of expanding a rail business.  In the US, the alternative to a haulage 
regime is either joint marketing with another railway, or trackage rights.  Joint marketing 
raises the issue of antitrust enforcement (from which the railways are no longer immune 
following the Staggers Act reforms).  If trackage rights are granted, they become a matter 
of public record, kept by the STB, and also expose the railway to compensation claims 
from employees if the tenant railway takes business from the host.  Haulage regimes 
suffer neither of these disadvantages for the railways concerned, and for shippers, they 
allow a single point of contact for their freight task, regardless of the number of hauliers.   
 
Haulage regimes also represent a way to expand capacity without the expense of 
purchasing additional capital assets.  For this reason, they became a popular approach in 
the US in the 1970s, when the railways were starved of capital and often unable to invest 
in wagons themselves.  The use of private wagons for risk sharing remains popular today, 
and not only in the US; in Australia, railways and coal mining companies have engaged 
in similar risk sharing arrangements in respect to coal wagons.  In the US, shippers 
themselves rarely own cars.  Instead, the cars are most often owned by car leasing 
companies, who therefore bear the long-run risk of car ownership.  The railways 
themselves also make use of leased cars, particularly through TTX, a car-owning 
company jointly owned by a number of the Class One railways themselves, which owns 
more than 210,000 railway cars, mostly intermodal, flatbed and car-carrying wagons. 
 
Private wagons and haulage regimes are not a 21st, or even a 20th Century innovation.  As 
the railways expanded in Britain in the 1830s and 1840s, it soon became apparent that the 
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needs of shippers and the geographical limits of each railway were not the same.  Hence 
railways adopted a system of bilateral accounts to allow passenger cars and good wagons 
to pass from one railway to another.  This soon became very complex, and thus, at the 
suggestion of a London banker (the banks had faced much the same problem with 
cheques, some 70 years previously), the railways formed a Railway Clearing House, 
which created an efficient system of swapping cars between railways through a 
centralised pool.  Lardner (1855) provides a detailed account as to how this first railway 
pool, soon copied around the world as railways faced the same problem, operated.  
 
In the sample period analysed, private cars have become an increasingly large share of 
overall car miles for US Class One railways.  Figure Three shows  the growth in both 
private and own car miles.  The left hand side of Figure Three shows the growth of 
private and own car miles used in minerals related freight tasks, and the right hand side 
shows the growth of private car miles and owned car miles more generally. 
 


















































































































Mining pvt car miles mining own car miles Total pvt car miles total own car miles  
 
Source: STB R1 Annual Reports 
 
As a total proportion of car miles, private car miles now account for roughly 60 percent 
of the total, up from around 40 percent at the outset of the period.  However, when one 
examines wagons used in minerals traffic, the growth is far more pronounced, from 15 
percent of car miles at the outset of the period to more than 60 percent by 2006. 
Modelling Framework 
The cost function for US railways used in this analysis was estimated using the 
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In both equations, w denotes input prices, y output prices and t the technical variables.  In 
the first model, with two outputs, n=2, whilst in the second model, where rail output is 
split in three, n=3.   
 
Estimating the translog functional form as a system results in a singular covariance 
matrix, since factor shares add to one and hence have zero errors.  Following usual 
practice, the systems were estimated with one factor share equation removed.  Price 
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Symmetry implies αij= αji .  Price homogeneity and symmetry were imposed to add 
degrees of freedom to the regression.  Missing parameters were retrieved manually. 
 
The models were estimated using Zellner’s (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SURE) utilising maximum likelihood estimators for each equation in the system.  
Modelling was undertaken using SHAZAM (2004).4 Given the short timeframe for each 
railway in the panel (a maximum of 20 observations per railway), it was not reasonable to 
undertake a formal test of stationarity, as the critical values for such tests are justified by 
their asymptotic properties.  However, the diagonal elements of the autocorrelation 
coefficient matrix are close to one, suggesting the data may be non-stationary.  Moreover, 
the correlation between the output variables in levels form was in excess of 90 percent 
and such high multicollinearity clouded results for the model in levels form.  Estimating 
the model in first differences addresses both of these issues and, since the underlying 
model is linear, the coefficients can still be interpreted as they would be in a linear model. 
 
4 SHAZAM does not allow for GLS within its linear systems command.  It does, however, allow a non-
linear regression with an option (called ACROSS, see SHAZAM, 2004, p249) which estimates a SURE 
model with vector autoregressive errors.  This allows for maximum likelihood estimation of the regression 
parameters, provided the model converges, and provides efficient and consistent estimates of the 
coefficients.  The model estimated is a linear model, but due to the nature of SHAZAM, it was estimated 




Data used in this analysis come from the R1 Annual Reports filed by each of the Class 
One railways in the US.5  These reports are divided into a number of different schedules, 
and each schedule into a number of different line items.  The line items are consistent 
across all railways, and across all years in the sample.  Data from 1996 to 2006 are 
available on the website of the STB and data prior to 1996 were sourced from the 
Association of American Railroads, which compiles data from the Reports into its 
Analysis of Class One Railroads.  The generous assistance of the AAR in sourcing data 
prior to 1996 is gratefully acknowledged by the author. 
 
Data are annual, from 1987 to 2006 inclusive, although not every railway exists in every 
year, due to mergers.  Thus, the dataset forms an unbalanced panel.  The following 
describes the data used for each railway in the panel: 
• Atchison-Topeka and Santa Fe Railway: 1987-1995 (merged with Burlington 
National in 1995 to form Burlington National Santa Fe). 
• Burlington National: 1987-1995. 
• Burlington National Santa Fe: 1996-2006.  
• Canadian National: 2002-2006 (began reporting in 2002.  Prior to that, reporting is in 
respect to its two US railways, Illinois Central and Grand Trunk Western). 
• Chicago & North Western Railway: 1987-1994 (merged with Union Pacific in 1995). 
• Consolidated Rail: 1987-1999 (purchased in 1998 by CSX and Norfolk Southern, 
who divided the railway between them). 
• CSX Corporation: 1987-2006. 
• Denver and Rio Grand Western: 1987-1993 (part of Southern Pacific from 1988). 
• Grand Trunk Western: 1987-2001 (owned by Canadian National since the 1920s, but 
reports separately until 2001). 
• Illinois Central: 1987-2001 (purchased by Canadian National in 1998, but reports 
separately until 2001). 
• Kansas City Southern: 1987-2006. 
• Norfolk Southern: 1987-2006. 
• Soo Line: 1987-2006 (a subsidiary of Canadian Pacific Railway). 
• Southern Pacific: 1987-1996 (acquired by Union Pacific in 1996). 
• Union Pacific: 1987-2006. 
 
Table One summarises the data used.  In the first column, the Roman lettering represents 
the variable, and the Greek lettering in parentheses represents the coefficient used for the 
relevant variable, to assist in interpreting the table of results, Table Two.  Note that both 
OCM and OMCM have a coefficient denoted with β2 and that PCM and PMCM both 
have a coefficient denoted β3.  This is because two models are estimated; the first 
containing PCM and OCM, and the second containing NMOCM, OMCM and PMCM. 
 
 
     
                                                 
5 See http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/industry/econ_reports.html for details.  Far more detail can be found in the 
regulations covering reporting requirements, available from http://tiny.cc/5F.
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Table One: Variable Costs Model Regression Data 
Variable Description 
VC Variable costs: Total Operating Costs (Schedule 410, line 620) minus way and structures 
operating costs (Schedule 410, line 151). 
PL (α1) Price of Labour: Total salaries and wages (Schedule 410, line 620, column b) divided by 
numbers of staff (sourced from the AAR). 
PM (α2) Price of Materials: variable costs minus total salaries and wage for above rail operations, 
divided by gross ton miles hauled (Schedule 755 line 104). 
PE (α3) Price of Equipment: net investment per loaded train (see below). 
OCM (β2) Own Car Miles: miles travelled by cars owned or leased by a railway (Schedule 755, lines 
30 for loaded cars and 46 for empty cars).  
PCM (β3) Private Car Miles: miles travelled by cars owned by third parties (Schedule 755, lines 64 for 
loaded cars and 82 for empty cars). 
NMOCM (β1) Non Mineral Own Car Miles: car miles for wagon types not generally used for minerals 
haulage and owned or leased by the railway (see below). 
OMCM (β2) Own Mineral Car Miles: car miles for wagon types generally used for minerals haulage and 
owned or leased by the railway (see below). 
PMCM (β3) Private Mineral Car Miles: car miles for wagon types generally used for minerals haulage 
and owned by third parties (see below). 
RM (γ1) Route Miles: miles of road operated (Schedule 755, line 1). 
ALH (γ2) Average Length of Haul: revenue ton miles (Schedule 755, line 110) divided by revenue 
tons (Schedule 755, line 105). 
RK (γ3) Return on below rail capital per mile of road operated (see below). 
 
Two models are estimated, one comparing private car miles with own car miles and a 
second using non-mineral own car miles, own mineral car miles and private mineral car 
miles as three separate outputs.  In terms of variable costs, inputs (PE, PM and PL) and 
technical variables (RM, ALH and RK), both models are of the same form.  Each of the 
price variables are, in fact, proxies of price indices, which are a more proper input in the 
derivation of cost functions.  However, whilst such price indices are available for the 
industry as a whole, they are not available for individual railways.  The practice followed 
above is reasonably consistent with the literature in this regard. 
 
The model used in this paper conforms very closely to similar analyses undertaken by 
Bitzan (2000, 2003) and Ivaldi & McCullough (2001, 2006), which are themselves 
closely related to a history of the development of cost functions using Class One railway 
data (see Bitzan, 2000).  There are differences between this model and those in the 
literature.  In particular, this study uses car miles as the output of each railway (like Ivaldi 
& McCullough but unlike Bitzan) but it divides them in a unique fashion to explore the 
impacts of private car miles.  From a methodological perspective, Ivaldi & McCullough 
(2006) use a Generalised McFadden (1978) cost function rather than the translog function 
which has been used more widely in the past.  Their paper summarises the reasons for 
this choice of functional form.   
 
Most of the variables above are reasonably self-explanatory, but the output variables, and 
the variables related to capital expenditure require some further explanation.  The R1 
Annual Reports do not identify how much of a given commodity is carried.  However, 
they do divide car miles travelled into the different types of wagons.  Box cars, flat cars 
and refrigerated cars are generally used for intermodal and general freight, covered 
hopper cars are generally used for grain traffic, tankers are used for bulk liquids and 
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gondolas and open hopper cars are generally used for bulk minerals traffic.  This, of 
course, is a very rough categorisation, but it does allow one to partition the haulage task 
into different commodities.  In particular, it allows one to examine minerals haulage 
tasks, by examining gondola cars and open hopper car miles.  Ivaldi & McCullough 
(2001, 2006) use car miles in a similar fashion, but split output differently, as the focus of 
their work is different to that of this paper. 
 
The variables related to the price of equipment and the return on below-rail capital also 
require further explanation.  The R1 Annual Reports divide total investment (Schedule 
352B) into above (line 40) and below rail (line 31).  The reports also show accumulated 
depreciation (Schedule 335), again divided into above (line 40) and below (line 30) rail 
components.  The return on capital represents the opportunity cost of total above or 
below rail investment, net of accumulated depreciation, in each year.  The opportunity 
cost of capital is calculated by the STB each year (see http://tiny.cc/4krXE).6   
 
The return on below rail capital is normalised by route length to produce a technical 
variable which proxies track quality; greater investment in general relates to higher 
quality track.  The return on above rail investment is used to develop a price for above 
rail equipment (essentially locomotives and wagons).  To derive this price, one needs a 
denominator, much as one might use staff numbers to price labour.  I consider the 
relevant unit to be a loaded train.7  Thus, the total cost of above rail capital is divided by 
the number of loaded trains to give a price per train.  The number of loaded trains is a 
composite measure comprising loaded freight cars (Schedule 755 lines 120-122), total car 
miles (Schedule 755, line 88 minus lines 82 and 46) and total locomotive unit miles 
(Schedule 755 line 11).  Implicitly, it assumes one locomotive per train. 
Model Results 
Table Two provides a summary of the results of the model.  Various different 
specifications are examined.  However, all results (available from the author upon 
request) are broadly similar to those presented in Table Two.  The first two columns of 
Table Two summarise the results of Model One including two outputs; private car miles 
and own car miles.  The latter two columns summarise the results of Model Two with 
three outputs; own car non-mineral miles, own car mineral miles and private car mineral 
miles.  The single Greek letters refer to the first order effects of particular variables as 
summarised in Table One above.  The double subscript and double letter combination 
Greek letters refer to second order effects.  Thus α11 refers to the second order effect of 
the price of labour on itself (or the own price elasticity of labour), and β1γ2 refers to the 
second order effects of non- mineral own-car miles on the average length of haul (or the 
cross elasticity between these two variables). 
 
 
                                                 
6 For 2006, the STB decided to move from a discounted cash flow to a Capital Asset Pricing Model 
approach, which has generated great debate in the US rail industry.  As a result of this, the STB has yet to 
publish a 2006 cost of capital figure.  The cost of capital used for 2006 (9.5 percent) is based on private 
discussions with the AAR. 
7 Schedule 755 (lines 120-22) report numbers of loaded cars, not total numbers of cars. 
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Table Two: Model Results 
 PCM - OCM NMOCM – OMCM - PMCM 
  Coefficient T-RATIO Coefficient T-RATIO 
α0 0.00095097 0.095438 -0.005472 -0.61235 
α1 0.33143 16.592 0.30274 37.909 
α2 0.65092 44.623 0.64354 83.473 
α3  0.01765   101.43 0.05372   1,069.48  
β1  na na  0.32644 8.2721 
β2 0.3784 10.067 0.098631 4.3173 
β3 0.077223 3.4525 0.010896 2.3308 
γ1 0.23864 4.6918 0.10856 1.7228 
γ2 -0.037794 -0.52706 0.0032645 0.039258 
γ3 0.070574 2.3508 0.014734 0.48327 
α11 0.091115 10.331 0.091158 9.662 
α12 -0.091845 -10.283 -0.089998 -9.563 
α22 0.1034 9.9445 0.10499 9.7127 
α1 β1  na na  -0.0071289 -0.42347 
α2 β1  na na  0.011728 0.61495 
α1 β2 0.0026644 0.17722 0.0033149 0.32092 
α2 β2 0.027111 1.5935 0.011847 1.0005 
α1 β3 -0.0065013 -0.74984 -0.0017931 -0.99577 
α2 β3 0.0057052 0.57885 0.0018998 0.93537 
α1 γ1 0.019383 1.0523 0.025075 1.4157 
α1 γ2 -0.017816 -0.61627 -0.0034901 -0.11128 
α1 γ3 -0.0016316 -0.71227 -0.0010081 -0.42654 
α2 γ1 -0.041523 -1.9717 -0.042082 -2.0711 
α2 γ2 0.031619 0.95671 0.023824 0.67594 
α2 γ3 0.18982 3.0999 0.10668 1.7425 
β11  na na  -1.432 -3.4397 
β12  na na  -0.051617 -0.27376 
β13  na na  -0.020181 -0.44121 
β22 0.20431 0.55541 0.2496 1.4985 
β23 -0.58013 -3.1913 -0.0090458 -0.41003 
β33 -0.14412 -1.5588 0.0029698 0.78797 
β1 γ1  na na  1.0614 1.6078 
β1 γ2  na na  3.6982 3.6168 
β1 γ3  na na  0.26708 0.6613 
β2 γ1 -0.11794 -0.30667 -0.97866 -2.6454 
β2 γ2 1.9029 3.0658 -0.54762 -1.5065 
β2 γ3 -0.25344 -0.85782 -0.51538 -2.3966 
β3 γ1 -0.27159 -0.98753 0.062207 1.1084 
β3 γ2 0.21135 0.40781 -0.082125 -0.93107 
β3 γ3 -0.15479 -0.96877 -0.023417 -0.4785 
Durbin Watson 1.9864 2.0467 
Rho 0.00336 -0.02551 
Residual Sum 0.079511 -0.0031702 
R^2 between obs. & predict. 0.6148 0.9873 




The G’(H-1)G result indicates model convergence and hence maximum likelihood 
estimation.  The Durbin-Watson results suggest the modelling process has adequately 
accounted for serial correlation in the data.    In Table Two, the results for dummy 
variables, and the second order interaction effects between technical variables have been 
removed to save space.  Neither are of particular interest in this analysis, which focuses 
on effects associated with different output types.  Similarly, the coefficients on the 
second order interaction effects between inputs have not been recovered. 
 
Turning first to the first order effects, all of the input and output coefficients are positive 
(but not all technical coefficients are), indicating that an increase in inputs or an increase 
in outputs increase variable costs.  This is to be expected.  The most important results 
from the perspective of this paper are the coefficients associated with private car miles.  
In each case, the coefficients on these variables is smaller, by roughly an order of 
magnitude, than the corresponding coefficient for own car miles.  Moreover, these results 
are statistically significant, and F-tests on the equality of each coefficient suggests that 
the differences between them are statistically significant as well.  It seems that, for an 
average US railway, it is much less costly to the railway to haul an additional car-load of 
freight using a third party wagon than it is to haul it using its own wagons.  This is 
especially the case for wagons which haul bulk minerals.  The results are not particularly 
surprising, given that the railways do not have to pay the capital costs of private wagons. 
 
Few of the second order effects are significant.  The own and cross price elasticities of 
inputs are significant and, moreover, reflect their expected signs; own price elasticities 
are negative and cross price elasticities are positive.  This suggests the cost function is at 
least reasonably well behaved.   
Analysis 
The central result, that private car haulage has a much smaller impact on the cost function 
than haulage with a railway’s own wagons, stands in contrast to the findings in the 
literature concerning access to a third party’s trains; most particularly the work of Bitzan 
(2000,2003) and Ivaldi & McCullough (2005), who analyse third party access using US 
data.  This suggests that, whilst substantial synergies exist between joint ownership of the 
track and the trains, fewer synergies exist between owning the locomotive and the 
wagons.  These synergies, moreover, are much smaller than the opportunity costs of 
capital associated with wagon ownership.  This is perhaps not surprising.  A haulage 
regime requires no independent train management role, and third parties are forced by the 
nature of the regime to adhere to the train timetabling set by the host railway.  Moreover, 
a haulage regime creates a physical connection between the host railway and the access 
seeker, which allows for an opportunity to check that engineering aspects of the third 
party’s wagons (like wheel profile, for example) match those by which the host railway 
maximises the efficiency of the wheel-rail interface.  It is thus not surprising that Class 
One railways have increased their use of private cars.  What is not clear is whether the 
current (roughly) 60-40 split between private and owned cars represents an industry 
equilibrium, or whether the railways will divest themselves of more wagons in the future.  
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However, before the US experience is translated into a recommendation that mandatory 
haulage regimes are appropriate for the Pilbara, a number of caveats need to be explored. 
 
Firstly, and perhaps most importantly from the perspective of public policy, the costs 
above refer to the costs of the host railway, not the total costs of operating trains with 
third party wagons.  Since the host railway does not own the third-party wagons, their 
capital, maintenance and depreciation costs do not appear on its books.  It is not possible 
to add such costs into the above analysis because we do not have the costs of wagons to 
third parties.  From a system-wide perspective, one only saves with a haulage regime 
where the third parties have lower costs of wagon ownership and operation than the host 
railway.  To the extent that economies of scale and scope exist in the purchase and 
maintenance of wagons (the widespread use of wagon leasing companies by both US 
railways and shippers suggests that they do), smaller wagon owners seem likely to face 
higher costs than larger wagon owners.  This is an important consideration in respect to a 
haulage regime in the Pilbara.  One of the important justifications by the NCC and State 
Government for access is that it will allow competition to develop in what each describes 
as the “market” for mining tenements (see NCC, 2005).  In particular, the WA 
Government hopes that a haulage regime will allow smaller miners with access to 
deposits but without the capital to build a railway to begin export operations.  However, 
if the costs of these smaller operators are higher than those of the incumbent and if a 
haulage regime acts as intended, it seems likely to increase, not decrease system costs.   
 
The second caveat is that the low costs show, in many cases, what has been achieved 
after more than a century of operation of private wagons on US railways.  Over this time, 
the US rail system has evolved to accommodate private wagons, and the above models 
thus show what is possible, not what is inevitable.  Moreover, since haulage in the US is 
voluntary and does not occur with any regulatory involvement, third-party wagon owners 
cannot use the regulator as a strategic tool in negotiating access with the host railway.  If 
a regulator becomes involved, the access seeker may be able to use it to force the host 
railway to accept compromises in its operational parameters which would advantage the 
access seeker, but increase the costs of the railway operator.   
 
The above regressions answer the question, “how much, on average, does a private 
wagon impact upon the operating costs of a host railway compared with a railway-owned 
wagon?”.  It does not address the question, “if a railway is at capacity, how are costs 
affected by adding another wagon?”.  The answer will obviously be very different.  The 
very low coefficients on private wagons above occur because they are not, in general, 
displacing wagons operated by the railways themselves.  Since haulage agreements are 
based upon bilateral negotiation, a railway only has an incentive to grant access when 
doing so will not displace its own more highly valued business.  In the case where a 
railway is at capacity, and private wagons can only be accommodated by displacing 
wagons operated by the railway itself, the relevant cost of the railway regime is the 
coefficient above plus the opportunity cost of one of the railway’s own wagons.  
Alternatively, the cost is the coefficient above plus the cost of new infrastructure required 




In the data provided by Class One railways, little information is provided about the type 
of haulage, beyond what can be inferred by the types of wagons used.  However, 
discussions with industry in the US reveal that there is a trend in the US towards private 
wagons for point to point coal haulage (particularly by railways in the Western States) 
whilst railways use their own wagons to haul coal from multiple sources to multiple 
destinations (more prevalent in the Eastern States).  Point to point haulage of bulk 
minerals is the lowest cost form of rail haulage there is.  Thus, part of the explanation for 
the very low coefficients, particularly when one compares own wagon with private 
wagon haulage of minerals, may stem from the fact that, on balance, private wagons are 
being used for lower cost haulage tasks than wagons owned by the railways themselves.  
To the extent that this is true, the cost differentials between owned and private wagons 
for a like haulage task are likely to be narrower than suggested in the regression results 
above.  Unfortunately, the same discussions with US industry were unable to shed light 
on how much point-to-point coal haulage was being done in private wagons, compared to 
other types of haulage, and thus it is not clear by how much the cost gap would narrow 
once one takes the mix of haulage tasks into account. 
 
Finally, it is useful to ascertain whether the regression models undertaken in this paper 
could provide a useful basis for the pricing of a haulage regime in Australia.  The price of 
haulage should properly be based upon the impacts said haulage has on the costs of an 
efficient railway.  From the models, presuming the US railways being examined are 
efficient, it is possible to ascertain the impacts on variable costs of an increase in private 
cars and minerals cars.  From Model One, a one percent increase in private car miles 
results in an increase in variable costs of roughly 0.077 percent, and from Model Two, an 
increase of private minerals car miles of one percent results in an in an increase in 
variable costs of roughly 0.011 percent.  Evaluated at the weighted average of private car 
miles and private minerals car miles respectively,8 these elasticity results translate into 
costs per car mile of 10.9 cents and 8.2 cents respectively.   
 
From a policy perspective, the issue is how to turn these costs into something which 
might be used in the Australian context, where there are no private car miles which can 
be put into a regression model and analysed as is done above.  A number of perspectives 
are possible.  The first of these could be to endeavour to set access prices based upon 
some weighted average of variable costs per car mile.  Adopting this approach results in 
costs of roughly 67 cents per car mile, which is clearly much larger than the actual costs 
incurred by the host railway from hauling private cars.  A second might be to proxy costs 
by examining the costs associated with the haulage of a railway’s own wagons, perhaps 
modelling these costs via an econometric approach such as that outlined in this paper.  
However, taking the same approach as outlined above for private car miles and private 
minerals car miles and applying this to own car miles in Model One gives a cost of 48.8 
cents per car mile, again, much larger than the cost of private car miles.  Applying the 
approach in Model Two gives a cost of 30.3 cents per car mile for non-mineral own car 
                                                 
8 The weighting is based upon the share of (logged) costs of the given railway in a given year as a 
proportion of the total (logged) costs over the whole time period.  Unweighted averages give roughly the 
same results.  
  16
 
miles, and 36.3 cents for mineral own car miles.  Clearly, using this approach would yield 
prices which are much too high. 
 
A final approach is to examine accounting data.  Strictly speaking, the comparison is 
somewhat dubious, because the various elements of the accounting spreadsheet are not 
constructed in the same manner as the model inputs, and do not contain the same 
elements as the regressions used here.  However, these accounting data are likely to be 
the only elements which are common between the US railways and their Australian 
equivalents; all trains, for example, require drivers, fuel and so on, and these line items 
are usually reflected in a roughly similar (or at least translatable)  fashion across railways.  
Thus, they may be all Australian policymakers have to try and translate the US 
experience into an Australian context. 
 
The US Class One railways list five elements in their (freight related) operating costs:9
• Salaries & Wages (Schedule 410, Column b). 
• Materials Tools, Supplies, Fuels & Lubricants (Schedule 410, Column c). 
• Purchased Services (Schedule 410, Column d). 
• General (Schedule 410, Column e). 
• Total Freight Expense (Schedule 410, Column f), the sum of the previous four. 
 
Taking the share of each of the first four elements as a proportion of the fifth, and 
applying the same weighting as above,10 one obtains the following costs per ton-mile: 
• Salaries & Wages     21.8 cents. 
• Materials Tools, Supplies, Fuels & Lubricants 11.0 cents. 
• Purchased Services     15.6 cents. 
• General      19.1 cents. 
 
The results are rough, but appear to suggest that if access were priced at the per car mile 
price of fuel and related consumables, it would probably be about correct.  This is not 
overly surprising, because most of the other costs associated with a haulage regime would 
in fact be fixed; each train still has one driver, and the railway still needs to maintain the 
same track and above-rail infrastructure, but its fuel bill will likely increase because 
hauling additional wagons requires more fuel.  It also suggests that complex cost models 
as used in the building-block method of regulation now widespread amongst Australian 
regulators might be unnecessary in this case.  It may in fact be possible to regulate by 
requiring that haulage rates on uncongested track are roughly in line with per car mile 
fuel and consumables costs, perhaps with a margin to reflect the inevitable inexactitudes 
of econometric models such as those used in this paper. 
Conclusions and Policy Ramifications 
This paper explores the question of the costs associated with haulage regimes on 
railways.  To the knowledge of the author, no mandatory haulage regime exists in the 
world at present, but it being proposed for the Pilbara region of Western Australia as a 
                                                 
9 Note the differences between these four elements and the inputs of each model described in Table One. 
10 Again, unweighted average results are very similar. 
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less invasive form of third party access than allowing third party trains to access the 
track.  Given the size and importance of this industry to the Australian economy, it is 
worthwhile to examine what the costs of such a regime might be. 
 
Whilst there are no mandatory haulage regimes, voluntary haulage of wagons other than 
those owned by the host railway is as old as railways themselves.  In particular, US Class 
One Railways have both a well-developed system of voluntary haulage regimes, and an 
excellent data-set with which one can examine the impacts of such regimes on the costs 
of the host railway. 
 
The paper examines two models.  The first examines just private car miles and own car 
miles as outputs, comparing the costs of each.  The second divides total car miles a little 
further, separating out private car miles that are used in the haulage of minerals.  This 
latter model is perhaps closest to the situation which exists in the Pilbara region of WA.  
 
The paper finds that the costs to the host railway of increasing traffic using private cars is 
much lower than the cost of increasing traffic using its own cars.  In a sense, this is not 
surprising, as the railway does not have to pay for the cars.  It implies is that haulage has 
a relatively small impact on the operations of the host railway, at least in optimal 
circumstances.  This stands in contrast to studies of third party access at the level of a 
train, which find substantial increases in costs in the US context.   
 
The modelling results further suggest that the balance-sheet costs of fuel and other 
consumables are probably a reasonable good proxy for the impact on the host railway of 
a haulage regime, and thus that this could form a reasonable basis for an access price.  
This avoids much of the complexity of current regulatory models. 
 
Before a model such as this is used in any form of policy formation, however, it is 
important to outline its limitations.  Two, in particular, stand out.  Firstly, the model 
examines only the costs of the host railway.  Although it does not have to purchase and 
maintain the wagons, someone must.  Policy is rightly concerned with the system as a 
whole, not just the host railway.  The cost of the system as a whole will only be reduced 
if the third party which actually owns the wagons is able to purchase and maintain them 
at a lower cost than the host railway.  If this is not the case, then a haulage regime will 
increase, not decrease, overall system costs. 
 
Secondly, the US railways are not compelled to provide haulage, and so would not do so 
when they did not have spare capacity in their system for additional wagons.  Where a 
railway operates at full capacity and the railway operator is forced to provide haulage, it 
would need to be compensated for any lost traffic this causes, as its own wagons are 
displaced to make way for those of a third party.  As such, haulage regimes are best 
suited for lines which have spare capacity.  However, given the relatively low cost to the 
host railway of hauling private wagons compared to hauling its own, it is unclear why a 
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